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Abstract—Spectrum auction is an effective approach to im-
proving spectrum utilization, by leasing idle spectrum from
primary users to secondary users. Recently, a few differentially
private spectrum auction mechanisms have been proposed, but,
as far as we know, none of them addressed the differential
privacy in the setting of double spectrum auctions. In this
paper, we combine the concept of differential privacy with
double spectrum auction design, and present a Differentially
private Double spectrum auction mechanism with approximate
Social welfare Maximization (DDSM). Specifically, we design the
mechanism by employing the exponential mechanism to select
clearing prices for the double spectrum auction with probabilities
exponentially proportional to the related social welfare values,
and then improve the mechanism in several aspects like the de-
signs of the auction algorithm, the utility function and the buyer
grouping algorithm. Through theoretical analysis, we prove that
DDSM achieves differential privacy, approximate truthfulness,
approximate social welfare maximization. Extensive experimental
evaluations show that DDSM achieves a good performance in
term of social welfare.
Index Terms—Differential privacy, Exponential mechanism,
Spectrum auction, Truthfulness, Social welfare
I. INTRODUCTION
W ITH the rapid development of wireless technologies,radio spectrum has become a scarce resource. Being
controlled by governmental agencies (e.g., Federal Commu-
nication Commission (FCC) in the US), spectrum is usually
distributed with traditional static allocation policy. Neverthe-
less, researches have shown that the efficiency of this type
of spectrum allocation is low in both spatial and temporal
dimensions. The major problem of static spectrum allocations
is that large amounts of distributed spectrum channels owned
by licensed primary users are often idle in geographic areas,
while unlicensed secondary users starve for spectrum chan-
nels to complete their work. Thus, to alleviate this conflict,
spectrum actions [1] have emerged to redistribute spectrum
channels from licensed primary users to unlicensed secondary
users. Due to their perceived fairness and allocation efficiency,
spectrum auctions are regarded as an effective market-based
approach to mitigating the problem of spectrum scarcity.
In recent years, numerous truthful spectrum auction mech-
anisms have been proposed. Truthfulness incentivizes bidders
to bid their true valuations, and thus avoids market operations.
Nevertheless, truthfully bidding also reveals bidders’ true
valuations to the auctioneer, leading to serious privacy issues.
To protect privacy, some privacy-preserving spectrum auction
schemes based on techniques of cryptography or secure multi-
party computation have been proposed [2], [3], [4], [5], [6].
These schemes protect privacy from a dishonest auctioneer
in the process of auction computations, but normally do not
consider the privacy issue by inferring sensitive information
from the auction outcome. This later issue can be addressed
by spectrum auction mechanisms with differential privacy
guarantee, and this is what we focus in this paper.
Typically, the change in only one bidder’s bid in an auction
might significantly impact on the auction outcome. Conversely,
by comparing the outcomes of two auctions whose bid profiles
only differ in a single bid, one could infer some sensitive
information on bidders’ bids. For instance, three bidders A, B
and C bid 9, 8 and 5, respectively, for a good in a second-
price auction. The auction outcome is that the winner is A
and its price is 8. Some time later, the same auction happens
again except that B lowers its bid to 0. Then the auction
outcome becomes that the winner is A and its price is 5. By
comparing the two outcomes, B knows that the third price is
5, which should be kept secret in a second price auction. To
address this issue, the concept of differential privacy [7], [8]
has been applied to ensure that any such two auctions produce
almost identically distributed outcomes, and thus little sensi-
tive information would be leaked by outcome comparisons.
In fact, there have been several spectrum auction mechanisms
proposed with differential privacy guarantee recently [9], [10].
However, they only addressed single-sided spectrum auctions.
As far as we know, there is no previous work addressing
differential privacy in the setting of double spectrum auctions.
To fill this gap, our aim is to design a differentially private
mechanism for double spectrum auctions.
In this paper, we propose a Differentially private Double
spectrum auction mechanism with approximate Social welfare
Maximization (DDSM). As shown in Fig. 1, in the auction
framework, sellers submit their quotations, and buyers submit
their bids to an auctioneer, who performs the auction com-
putations, and announces the auction outcome to both sellers
and buyers after the auction. We assume that the auctioneer
is trusted, or otherwise we can simulate a trusted auctioneer
with secure multi-party computations. To achieve differential
privacy, we employ one exponential mechanism [11] to select
the selling clearing price, and the other to select the buying
clearing price, exponentially proportional to their related social
welfare values, respectively. And then we use both selling and
buying clearing prices to determine the winners and allocate
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Fig. 1. Auction framework of DDSM: Sellers submit their quotations and
buyers submit their bids to the auctioneer, and the auctioneer returns the
results to them.
spectrum channels. We carefully design our double spectrum
auction mechanism such that it also achieves approximate
truthfulness and approximate social welfare maximization.
Later, we improve our mechanism in several aspects, and
further promote the performance of our auction mechanism
in term of the social welfare.
Our main contributions can be summarized as follows.
• We integrate the exponential mechanism with double
spectrum auction to achieve differential privacy and ap-
proximate social welfare maximization. We also carefully
design the auction mechanism to achieve approximate
truthfulness. As far as we know, our proposal is the
first differentially private mechanism for double spectrum
auctions.
• We improve our mechanism in the designs of auction
algorithm, utility function, and grouping algorithm, such
that it achieves a better performance in term of social wel-
fare, and it is applicable to any random buyer grouping
algorithm independent on buyers’ bids.
• We fully implement DDSM, and do extensive experi-
ments to evaluate the performance in term of social wel-
fare. The experimental results show that our mechanism
achieves a good performance compared to the double
spectrum auction without differential privacy guarantee.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion II briefly reviews related work and Section III provides
the problem model and introduces some related concepts. We
present the detailed design and theoretical proof of DDSM in
Section IV, and improve DDSM in Section V. In Section VI,
we implement DDSM, and evaluate the performance in terms
of social welfare. In the end, the paper is summarized in
Section VII.
II. RELATED WORK
Truthful spectrum auctions. In recent years, a large
number of truthful spectrum auction mechanisms have been
proposed. Zhou et al. proposed TRUST [12], the first truthful
double spectrum auction framework enabling spectrum reuse.
Jia et al. [13] designed an exponential-time truthful spectrum
auction mechanism with optimal revenue, and further pre-
sented a truthful suboptimal auction mechanism in polynomial
time. In [14], the author proposed a polynomial-time truthful
spectrum auction mechanism with a performance guarantee on
revenue. Papers [15], [16] and [17] designed efficient spectrum
allocation algorithms to achieve truthfulness and maximize
social welfare. Unfortunately, none of these mechanisms con-
sidered any guarantee of privacy.
Privacy-preserving spectrum auctions. There are mainly
two kinds of related works for privacy-preserving auctions.
One is to protect privacy with cryptographical techniques from
attacks inferring sensitive information by analyzing the process
of auction computations, and the other is to protect privacy
with the notion of differential privacy from attacks inferring
sensitive information by analyzing the auction outcome. A
brief review for these two kinds of works is given as follows.
Cryptographically private spectrum auctions. Pan et al.
proposed THEMIS [18], the first secure spectrum auction to
prevent malicious behaviors of the auctioneer. Later, Huang
et al. [2] presented SPRING, the first strategy-proof and
privacy-preserving spectrum auction mechanism. Whereafter,
a strategy-proof mechanism was designed to maximize social
welfare without disclosing the bid privacy in [3]. Wu et
al. [19] designed both strategy-proof and privacy-preserving
auction mechanisms for noncooperative wireless networks.
These works above mainly focused on privacy preservation for
single-sided spectrum auctions. For double spectrum auctions,
papers [5], [6] employed various cryptography techniques to
achieve privacy preservation. However, these studies preserved
privacy in the process of auction computations, and they did
not consider the privacy issues that resulted from analyzing
the auction outcome.
Differentially private spectrum auctions. Lately, a new con-
cept of differential privacy [7], [8] is proposed. Then, McSh-
erry and Talwar [11] first combined differential privacy with
mechanism design, paying attention to approximate truthful-
ness, collusion resilience and mechanism repeatability. Huang
and Kannan [20] further studied the exponential mechanism,
the first general tool used to design mechanisms achieving
both truthfulness and differential privacy. Xu et al. [21] first
addressed the privacy-preserving cloud resource allocation
problem based on differential privacy. Dong et al. [22] de-
signed a novel scheme to select spectrum-sharing secondary
user in a differentially private manner. In [9], [10], [23],
applying differential privacy, authors designed mechanisms
with approximate truthfulness and revenue maximization for
single-sided spectrum auctions. As far as we know, none of
the existing works protects differential privacy in the setting
of double spectrum auctions.
III. TECHNICAL PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we provide the problem model of the
double spectrum auction, and introduce some related solution
concepts about mechanism design and differential privacy.
A. Problem Model
We consider a sealed-bid double spectrum auction with one
auctioneer, M sellers and N buyers. We assume that each
seller sells one distinct channel and each buyer buys one
channel like the work [24]. The channels are homogeneous
to buyers, so that each buyer could request any channel. A
sealed-bid auction is run by the auctioneer who is trustworthy.
3Bidders submit their bids privately to the auctioneer without
any knowledge of others, then the auction mechanism outputs
the final prices to determine the winners.
Spectrum auctions are different from traditional auctions,
because spectrum has reusability of time and space (Here
we mainly consider spatial reusability). Spatial reusability
indicates that multiple buyers can share the same channel if
they do not interfere with each other. In the auction, we want
to protect the bidders’ privacy and meanwhile maximize the
social welfare. Here, the social welfare the auction mechanism
is defined as the sum of the true values of all winning buyers
subtracting that of all winning sellers. Better social welfare
means more social value created by an auction.
In the auction, let q denote the profile of all quotations of
sellers and b denote the profile of all bids of buyers. Each
seller m submits its quotation qm ∈ [1, qmax] for selling a
channel, based on its true valuation vsm, and gets p
s
m as its
final selling price of the channel. Each buyer n submits its bid
bn ∈ [1, bmax] for buying a channel, based on its true valuation
vbn, and gets p
b
n as its final buying price of the channel. If the
seller or buyer wins, it has the utility of um = psm − vsm or
un = p
b
n − vbn; else the utility is 0. In a truthful auction, any
bidder cannot improve its utility by submitting a dishonest
quotation or bid, that is qm 6= vsm or bn 6= vbn. When the
auction is of individual rationality, each winning seller gets a
selling price not lower than its quotation, and each winning
buyer gets a buying price not higher than its bid.
B. Related Solution Concepts
we now review some important and related solution con-
cepts used in this paper from mechanism design and differen-
tial privacy.
Firstly, we introduce some important definitions in mecha-
nism design.
Definition 1 (Dominant Strategy [25]). Strategy si is a player
i’s dominant strategy in a game, if for any strategy s′i 6= si
and any other players’ strategy profile s−i,
ui(si, s−i) ≥ ui(s′i, s−i)
The concept of truthfulness is related to dominant strategy.
For each bidder in an auction, truthfulness means revealing
its truthful value is a dominant strategy. However, exact truth-
fulness for auctions is often too restrictive to be compatible
with other properties such as social welfare maximization, and
thus we turn to consider a weaker notion of γ-truthfulness.
Moreover, for double spectrum auctions, we should achieve
both seller and buyer truthfulness. Therefore, according to
the definition of approximate truthfulness in literature [26],
we give the definition of γ-truthfulness for double spectrum
auctions as shown in Definition 2.
Definition 2 (γ-truthfulness). Let b denote the profile of all
buyers’ truthful bids, q denote the profile of all sellers’ truthful
quotations. Let bn and qm denote the truthful strategies for
any buyer n and any seller m, respectively. A double auction
mechanism is γ-truthfulness in expectation, if and only if for
any strategy b′n 6= bn it satisfies
E[un(bn,q,b−n)] ≥ E[un(b′n,q,b−n)]− γ
at the same time, for any strategy q′m 6= qm it satisfies
E[um(qm,b,q−m)] ≥ E[un(q′m,b,q−m)]− γ
where b−n represents the strategy profile of buyers except
buyer n, q−m represents the strategy profile of sellers except
seller m, and γ are a small constant.
Differential privacy has been widely studied in the field of
theoretical computer science [7]. This privacy concept ensures
that for any two adjacent databases, the two corresponding
outputs resulted are basically consistent. The specific definition
in our context is as follows.
Definition 3 (Differential Privacy). Let b denote the profile
of all buyers’ bids, q denote the profile of all sellers’ quo-
tations, and D = b ∪ q represent the union profile of the
two aforementioned profiles. A randomized double spectrum
auction mechanism M gives -differential privacy, if for any
two profiles D and D′ differing in the value of only one bid
or quotation, and all S ⊆ Rang(M), it satisfies
Pr[M(D) ∈ S] ≤ exp()× Pr(M(D′) ∈ S)
where  is a small constant called the privacy budget repre-
senting the privacy level achieved.
A power tool to achieve differential privacy is exponential
mechanism. It assigns a selection probability to each possible
outcome according to a utility function that maps a pair of
input and outcome to a utility score. It is defined as follows:
Definition 4 (Exponential Mechanism [11]). Given a range P,
and a utility function F (D, p) that takes as input a data profile
D and an output p in the range P, the exponential mechanism
M(D, F,P) outputs p from the range P with probability
Pr[M(D, F,P) = p] ∝ exp(F (D, p)/2∆F )
where ∆F is the sensitivity of function F , maximum difference
between the two utility scores of any pair of data profiles D
and D′ differing in the value of a single element for any output
p, and  is the privacy budget.
Some theoretical results on differential privacy, which will
be used in our later proofs, are depicted in the following
lemmas.
Lemma 1 (Composition [27]). Given the randomized algo-
rithmM1(D) that satisfies 1-differential privacy andM2(D)
that satisfies 2-differential privacy, then M(D)=(M1(D),
M2(D)) satisfies (1 + 2)-differential privacy.
Lemma 2 (Convexity [28]). Given k mechanisms M1, M2,
..., Mk that satisfy -differential privacy, and p1, p2, ..., pk ∈
[0,1] such that
∑k
i=1 pi = 1, letM denote the mechanism that
appliesMi with probability pi. ThenM satisfies -differential
privacy.
IV. OUR MECHANISM: DDSM
In this section, we design our differentially private double
spectrum auction mechanism, DDSM, and analyze its related
properties.
4A. Design Rationale
We integrate the exponential mechanism with double spec-
trum auction to achieve differential privacy, γ-truthfulness and
approximate social welfare maximization. Basically, DDSM
is a uniform price auction, where all sellers are paid with
a selling clearing price, and all buyers are charged with a
buying clearing price. Our main idea is to randomly select
a selling clearing price from the set of selling prices, and
then a buying clearing price from the set of buying prices,
both with carefully designed probability distributions. These
probability distributions should ensure that the auction mecha-
nism produces outcome with guarantees of differential privacy,
γ-truthfulness and approximate social welfare maximization.
There are mainly two design challenges, and we address them
as follows.
The first challenge is how to perform the double-sided pay-
ment selection, while guaranteeing the differential privacy, γ-
truthfulness and approximate social welfare maximization. We
address this challenge by applying one exponential mechanism
to select the selling clearing price and the other exponential
mechanism to select the buying clearing price, and then
sequentially compose the two mechanisms to get the whole
design.
The second challenge is how to group the buyers while
preserving differential privacy. To address this challenge, our
main idea is to use a deterministic buyer grouping algorithm
independent of buyers’ bids, generating a fix grouping for any
set of buyers. In next section, we will show that a randomized
grouping algorithm independent of buyers’ bids can be also
applicable.
B. Design Detail
Now, we describe the detailed design of DDSM. Specifi-
cally, DDSM consists of the following three steps.
(1) Buyer Group Formation
In order to exploit spatial reusability of spectrum, in this
step DDSM gathers buyers into groups, such that members
in the same group do not conflict with each other. Moreover,
the group formation should be deterministic and independent
of buyers’ bids, and hence changing any buyer’s bid will not
affect the group formation. That is, by defining neighboring
bid profiles as those only differing in a single bid value, we
can see that any two neighboring bid profiles respond to the
same group form. Specifically, we let the auctioneer construct
a conflict graph of buyers according to their geographic
locations, and then deterministically find independent sets of
nodes (buyers) as the buyer groups. Buyers in the same group
can use the same channel. We denote the buyer groups as
G = {Gl|l = 1, 2, ..., L}.
(2) Double-sided Price Selection
In this step, DDSM employs one exponential mechanism
to select the selling clearing price and the other to select
the buying clearing price, both with related social welfare
values as their utility functions. We describe the details in
the following.
First, the sets of both quotations and group bids are com-
puted. The set of quotations can be simply defined as [1..qmax],
where qmax denotes the maximum of all possible quotations.
To compute the set of group bids, we need to compute the
maximum of all possible group bids. The group bid gl of group
Gl is defined as
gl = min
1≤i≤|Gl|
bl(i)× |Gl|
where bl(i) denotes the ith buyer’s bid in group Gl. Let the
maximum of all possible bids be bmax, and the maximum size
of all buyer groups be nmax, we get the maximum group bid is
nmax · bmax, and thus the set of group bids is [1..nmax · bmax].
Second, for fairness and efficiency, DDSM naturally sorts
sellers’ quotations in non-decreasing order and buyer groups’
bids in non-increasing order.
O′ : q1 ≤ q2 ≤ . . . ≤ qM
O′′ : g1 ≥ g2 ≥ . . . ≥ gL
That is, sellers with lower quotations are made to sell their
channels first, while groups with higher bids are made to buy
their channels first, too.
Third, the selling clearing price ps and then the buying
clearing price pg are randomly selected with their respec-
tive appropriate probability distributions. The two probability
distributions should be properly related to the social welfare
values that both clearing prices cause. Furthermore, to make all
resulted transactions are profitable, it is necessary that ps ≤ pg .
In the following, we first describe how to compute the related
social welfare values given a pair of clearing prices ps and
pg , and then account for how to compute the appropriate
probability distributions.
Computation of social welfare values. Given a pair of
clearing prices ps ∈ [1..qmax] and pg ∈ [ps..nmax · bmax],
we can find the set of ks = arg maxm{qm ≤ ps} potential
winning sellers in O′, and the set of kg = arg maxl{gl ≥ pg}
potential winning buyer groups in O′′. We denote the two sets
by TOP (O′, ks) and TOP (O′′, kg), respectively. Obviously,
these potential winners can make up at most k = min(ks, kg)
profitable transactions. Thus, we can determine k potential
winning sellers and k potential winning buyer groups as
the winners, and compute the resulted social welfare values.
Naturally, if ks = k (resp. kg = k), then all potential
winning sellers (resp. buyer groups) are the winners. However,
if ks > k (resp. kg > k), how to determine k winners out
of more than k potential winners is a subtlety for achieving
truthfulness. To prevent bid (resp. quotation) operation, the
winner determination should be independent on bids (resp.
quotations). Especially, note that selecting the k potential
winners with the kth highest bids (or quotations) allows market
operations. So, if ks > k (resp. kg > k), we just randomly
select k out of ks (resp. kg) potential winners as the winners.
We represent the sets of randomly selected k winning sellers
and k winning buyer groups as follows
Ws = RAND(TOP(O′, ks), k)
Wg = RAND(TOP(O′′, kg), k)
5Then the lth seller in Ws and the lth buyer group in
Wg form the lth transaction for winners. The social welfare
produced by the lth transaction can be computed as
wl =
|G′l|∑
i=1
bl(i)− q′l
where G′l represents the lth buyer group in Wg , and q′l
represents the quotation of the lth seller in Ws.
Therefore, given any pair of clearing prices ps and pg , we
can compute the resulted social welfare value as follows.
W (ps, pg) =
∑
1≤l≤k
wl (1)
Note that we write the resulted social welfare as W (ps, pg)
to explicitly indicate its dependence on ps and pg .
Computation of probability distributions. To achieve differ-
ential privacy, we need to select the selling clearing price ps
and then the buying clearing price pg with appropriate proba-
bility distributions. To do this, one exponential mechanism is
applied for each clearing price selection.
To select ps with the exponential mechanism, we need to
design a utility function that is only dependent on ps and
reflects a better social welfare value with a higher utility. We
let M1 denote the mechanism selecting ps, and define the
utility function as follows.
W1(q,b, ps) = max
pg
W (ps, pg) (2)
where we also indicate explicitly the dependence of W1 on
the buyers’ bid profile b and the sellers’ quotation profile q.
Since changing any bid or quotation has a maximum impact
of nmax ·bmax−1 on the social welfare, we get the sensitivity
∆W1 = nmax · bmax − 1.
According to the exponential mechanism, the probability
distribution of the selling clearing price can be computed as
follows.
Pr(M1(q,b) = ps) =
exp( 1W1(q,b,ps)2∆W1 )∑
p′s∈Ps exp(
1W1(q,b,p′s)
2∆W1
)
(3)
for all ps ∈ Ps, where Ps = [1..qmax], and 1 is the privacy
budget.
For selecting pg given ps with the exponential mechanism,
we let M2 denote this mechanism, and similarly define the
utility function as follows.
W2(q,b, ps, pg) = W (ps, pg) (4)
where we have ∆W2 = nmax · bmax − 1.
Then, according to the exponential mechanism, the proba-
bility distribution of the buying clearing price can be computed
as follows.
Pr(M2(q,b, ps) = pg) =
exp(
2W2(q,b,ps,pg)
2∆W2
)∑
p′g∈Pg(ps) exp(
2W2(q,b,ps,p′g)
2∆W2
)
(5)
for all pg ∈ Pg(ps). Here, we let Pg(ps) = [ps..nmax · qmax],
and 2 is the privacy budget.
To sum up, this step randomly selects the selling and
buying clearing prices ps and pg in term of the probability
distributions (3) and (5), respectively. The detailed procedure
is depicted in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Double-sided Price Selection
Input: The set of sellers M, the sellers’ quotation profile q,
the set of buyers N, the buyers’ bid profile b, the buyer
grouping G, and privacy budgets 1 and 2 with 1 + 2 =
.
Output: Selling and buying clearing prices ps and pg
(1) Compute group bids:
1: for l← 1 to L do
2: gl ← min1≤i≤|Gl| bl(i)× |Gl|
3: end for
(2) Sort quotations and bids:
4: O′ : q1 ≤ q2 ≤ . . . ≤ qM
5: O′′ : g1 ≥ g2 ≥ . . . ≥ gL
//For simplicity, same indexes are abused after sorting
(3) Compute social welfare values:
6: for ps ← 1 to qmax do
7: for pg ← ps to nmax · bmax do
8: ks ← arg maxm{qm ≤ ps}
9: kg ← arg maxl{gl ≥ pg}
10: k ← min(ks, kg)
11: Ws ← RAND(TOP(O′, ks), k)
12: Wg ← RAND(TOP(O′′, kg), k)
13: Compute W (ps, pg) from Ws and Wg using Eq. (1)
14: end for
15: end for
(4) Compute probability distributions and select prices:
16: for ps ← 1 to qmax do
17: W1(q,b, ps)← maxpg W (ps, pg)
18: ∆W1 ← nmax · bmax − 1
19: Pr(M1(q,b) = ps)← exp(
1W1(q,b,ps)
2∆W1
)∑
p′s∈Ps exp(
1W1(q,b,p
′
s)
2∆W1
)
20: end for
21: ps ←M1(q,b) // Select selling clearing price
22: for pg ← ps to nmax · bmax do
23: W2(q,b, ps, pg)←W (ps, pg)
24: ∆W2 ← nmax · bmax − 1
25: Pr(M2(q,b, ps) = pg)←
exp(
2W2(q,b,ps,pg)
2∆W2
)∑
p′g∈Pg(ps) exp(
2W2(q,b,ps,p
′
g)
2∆W2
)
26: end for
27: pg ←M2(q,b, ps) // Select buying clearing price
28: return ps and pg
(3) Auction Outcome Release
Having determined the clearing prices ps and pg , we now
turn to compute the resulted auction outcome. Just using
exactly the same method and the same randomness when we
compute the social welfare W (ps, pg) given ps and pg in the
previous step, we can easily find all winning sellers and all
winning buyer groups. And then for each winning buyer in
buyer group Gl, it will pay pg/|Gl|. Finally, the resulted social
welfare is just W (ps, pg).
6C. Analysis
Now, We prove that DDSM achieves differential privacy,
γ-truthfulness, individual rationality, budget balance and ap-
proximate social welfare maximization.
Theorem 1 states the -differential privacy of DDSM.
Theorem 1. DDSM achieves -differential privacy, where  =
1 + 2.
Proof. We denote a value profile B = q ∪ b as the union
of any pair of quotation and bid profiles (q,b), and denote
any neighboring profile by B′, which is only differing in
a single bid or quotation value from B. Let M1 and M2
denote the two mechanisms to randomly select ps and pg ,
respectively. The probability ratio of selecting ps ∈ Ps as the
selling clearing price for any pair of profiles B and B′ is
Pr(M1(B) = ps)
Pr(M1(B′) = ps)
=
exp(
1W1(B,ps)
2∆W1
)∑
p′s∈Ps exp(
1W1(B,p
′
s)
2∆W1
)
exp(
1W1(B
′,ps)
2∆W1
)∑
p′s∈Ps exp(
1W1(B
′,p′s)
2∆W1
)
=(
exp( 1W1(B,ps)2∆W1 )
exp( 1W1(B
′,ps)
2∆W1
)
)(
∑
p′s∈Ps exp(
1W1(B
′,p′s)
2∆W1
)∑
p′s∈Ps exp(
1W1(B,p′s)
2∆W1
)
)
≤ exp(1
2
)(
∑
p′s∈Ps exp(
1
2 )exp(
1W1(B,p
′
s)
2∆W1
)∑
p′s∈Ps exp(
1W1(B,p′s)
2∆W1
)
)
≤ exp(1
2
) exp(
1
2
)(
∑
p′s∈Ps exp(
1W1(B,p
′
s)
2∆W1
)∑
p′s∈Ps exp(
1W1(B,p′s)
2∆W1
)
)
= exp(1)
Symmetrically, we have exp(−1) ≤ Pr(M1(B)=ps)Pr(M1(B′)=ps) . Thus,
the M1 achieves 1-differential privacy.
Similarly, it can be proved that M2 achieves 2-differential
privacy. Finally, by the composition lemma(Lemma 1), DDSM
achieves -differential privacy, with  = 1 + 2.
The γ-truthfulness of the DDSM is stated in Theorem 2.
Theorem 2. DDSM is γ-truthful, where γ = max(1u1max,
2u2max).
Proof. For double spectrum auctions, we need to prove the
truthfulness for both sellers and buyers. We describe the proof
in the two aspects as follows.
(1) Proof of 1u1max-truthfulness for sellers
For sellers, the ranges of both prices and true values are
[1, qmax], so a seller’s maximum utility is u1max = qmax− 1.
We let wm denote whether a seller m wins (wm = 1) or not
(wm = 0). It is worth noting that in the winner determination,
we take a random selection of k sellers when the potential
winning sellers are more than k. So no matter how a seller
changes its own quotation within the range of less than the
clearing price ps, it has no effect on the auction outcome,
i.e, wm(qm,q−m,b, ps, pg) = wm(vsm,q−m,b, ps, pg). We
analyze the expected utility of any seller m in two cases as
follows.
• Case qm ≥ vsm: For any ps ∈ Ps, if qm > ps, the seller
m does not win (i.e, wm = 0) and his utility is 0; else
qm ≤ ps, the seller m is randomly selected as a winner
no matter its quotation is qm or vsm. Then, if the seller
m wins(i.e, wm = 1), its utility is um = (ps − vsm) > 0,
else the seller m is lost(i.e, wm = 0), and his utility is 0.
So we have
E[um(v
s
m,q−m,b,Ps)]
=
∑
ps∈Ps
Pr[M1(vsm,q−m,b) = ps]
× wm · (ps − vsm)
≥ exp(−1)
∑
ps∈Ps
Pr[M1(qm,q−m,b) = ps]
× wm · (ps − vsm)
= exp(−1)E[um(qm,q−m,b,Ps)]
≥ (1− 1)E[um(qm,q−m,b,Ps)]
= E[um(qm,q−m,b,Ps)]− 1E[um(qm,q−m,b,Ps)]
≥ E[um(qm,q−m,b,Ps)]− 1u1max
• Case qm < vsm: For any ps ∈ Ps, if vsm < ps and qm <
vsm, then the seller m wins with a certain probability (i.e,
wm = 1) and his utility is um = (ps − vsm) > 0; else
if vsm > ps > qm and the seller m is randomly selected,
then the seller m also wins(i.e, wm = 1), but his utility
is um = (ps − vsm) < 0 or the seller m is not a winner,
his utility is 0 ; else vsm > qm > ps, then the seller m
does not win(i.e, wm = 0) and his utility is 0. So
E[um(v
s
m,q−m,b,Ps)]
=
∑
ps∈Ps
Pr[M1(vsm,q−m,b) = ps]× wm · (ps − vsm)
≥
∑
(ps∈Ps)
∧
(ps>vsm)
Pr[M1(vsm,q−m,b) = ps]
× wm · (ps − vsm)
=
∑
(ps∈Ps)
∧
(ps>vsm)
Pr[M1(qm,q−m,b) = ps]
× wm · (ps − vsm)
≥ E[um(qm,q−m,b,Ps)]
From the above, for any seller m, we have
E[um(v
s
m,q−m,b,Ps)] ≥ E[um(qm,q−m,b,Ps)]−1u1max
(6)
Thus, DDSM is 1u1max-truthful for sellers.
(2) Proof of 2u2max-truthfulness for buyers
For buyers, the ranges of both prices and true values are
[1, bmax], so a buyer’s maximum utility is u2max = bmax−1.
Employing mechanism M2, we can determine the buying
clearing price pg for buyer groups. Note that mechanism M2
selecting the buying clearing price has obtained the seller
clearing price expressed by p1s. Then the buying clearing
price for buyers in each winning buyer group Gl, pbl =
pg
|Gl| .
Similarly, let wn denote whether a buyer n wins, and we have
wn(bn,q,b−n, pbn) = wn(v
b
n,q,b−n, p
b
n) once buyer n is in
a potential winning buyer group due to the random selection
of winning groups. For any buyer n, let bmin, gl denote the
minimum bid and group bid, respectively, of the group Gl that
7buyer n belongs to, and we analyze buyer n’s utility in the
following two cases.
• Case bn ≤ vbn: For any pg ∈ Pg(p1s), if gl < pg or
gl ≥ pg , and the group Gl is lost (i.e, wn = 0), the
utility of the buyer n is 0; else gl ≥ pg and the group l
is randomly selected, then bn ≥ bmin > pbn and bn ≤ vbn,
the group of the buyer n wins(i.e, wn = 1)and his utility
is un = (vbn − pbn) > 0. So
E[un(v
b
n,q,b−n, p
1
s,Pg(p1s))]
=
∑
pg∈Pg(p1s)
Pr[M2(vbn,q,b−n) = pg]× wn · (vbn − pbn)
≥ exp(−2)
∑
pg∈Pg(p1s)
Pr[M2(bn,q,b−n) = pg]
× wn · (vbn − pbn)
= exp(−2)E[un(bn,q,b−n, p1s,Pg(p1s))]
≥ (1− 2)E[un(bn,q,b−n, p1s,Pg(p1s))]
= E[un(bn,q,b−n, p
1
s,Pg(p1s))]
− 2E[un(bn,q,b−n, p1s,Pg(p1s))]
≥ E[un(bn,q,b−n, p1s,Pg(p1s))]− 2u2max
• Case bn > vbn: For any pg ∈ Pg(p1s), if bn < pbn or
bn > p
b
n > bmin, the buyer n does not win(i.e, wn =
0)and his utility is 0; else if gl ≥ pg and the group l is
selected with a certain probability, bn ≥ bmin > pbn and
vbn > p
b
n, then the buyer n wins(i.e, wn = 1) and his
utility is un = (vbn − pbn) > 0; if bn ≥ bmin > pbn and
vbn < p
b
n, then the buyer n wins(i.e, wn = 1), but his
utility is un = (vbn − pbn) < 0. So
E[un(v
b
n,q,b−n, p
1
s,Pg(p1s))]
≥
∑
(pg∈Pg(p1s))
∧
(pbn<v
b
n)
Pr[M2(vbn,q,b−n) = pg]
× wn · (vbn − pbn)
=
∑
(pg∈Pg(p1s))
∧
(pbn<v
b
n)
Pr[M2(bn,q,b−n) = pg]
× wn · (vbn − pbn)
≥ E[un(bn,q,b−n, p1s,Pg(p1s))]
From the above, for any buyer n, we have
E[un(v
b
n,q,b−n, p
1
s,Pg(p1s))]
≥ E[un(bn,q,b−n, p1s,Pg(p1s))]− 2u2max
(7)
Thus, DDSM is 2u2max-truthful for buyers. Let γ =
max(1u1max, 2u2max). We therefore have proved that
DDSM is γ-truthful.
It can be also proved that DDSM approximately maximizes
the social welfare as shown in Theorem 3.
Theorem 3. DDSM achieves approximate social welfare max-
imization.
Proof. We first analyze the expected utilities resulted from
mechanism M1 selecting selling clearing price ps and from
mechanism M2 selecting buying clearing price pg , and then
analyze the expected utility (social welfare) of the overall
mechanism of DDSM.
Let B = q ∪ b, and C = nmax · bmax − 1. Let OPT1 =
maxp∈Ps W1(B, p) denote the maximum W1 for mechanism
M1. Define the sets Rt1 = {p ∈ Ps : W1(B, p) > OPT1−t1}
and R2t1 = {p ∈ Ps : W1(B, p) ≤ OPT1 − 2t1} for a small
constant t1 > 0. We have
Pr(M1(B) ∈ R2t1) ≤
Pr(M1(B) ∈ R2t1)
Pr(M1(B) ∈ Rt1)
=
∑
p∈R2t1
exp(
1W1(B,p)
2C )∑
p′∈Ps exp(
1W1(B,p
′)
2C )∑
p∈Rt1
exp(
1W1(B,p)
2C )∑
p′∈Ps exp(
1W1(B,p
′)
2C )
=
∑
p∈R2t1 exp(
1W1(B,p)
2C )∑
p∈Rt1 exp(
1W1(B,p)
2C )
≤ |R2t1 |exp(
1(OPT1−2t1)
2C )
|Rt1 |exp( 1(OPT1−t1)2C )
=
|R2t1 |
|Rt1 |
exp(
−1t1
2C
)
≤ |Ps|exp(−1t1
2C
)
Then, Pr(M1(B) ∈ R2t1) ≥ 1− |Ps|exp(−1t12C ). If we let
t1 ≥ 2Cln(
|Ps|OPT1
t1
)
1
, we get Pr(M1(B) ∈ R2t1) ≥ 1− t1OPT1 .
Therefore, for any t1 ≥ 2Cln(
|Ps|OPT1
t1
)
1
, we have
Ep∈Ps [W1(B, p)] >
∑
p∈R2t1
W1(B, p)Pr(M1(B) = p)
> (OPT1 − 2t1)(1− t1
OPT1
)
> OPT1 − 3t1
(8)
If we let t1 =
2Cln(e+
1|Ps|OPT1
2C )
1
≥ 2C1 , and we have
2Cln( |Ps|OPT1
t1
)
1
≤ 2Cln(e+
1|Ps|OPT1
2C
)
1
= t1
Then put t1 into Eq. (8), we get the expected utility of
mechanism M1
Ep∈Ps [W1(B, p)] > OPT1 − 3t1
> OPT1 − 3
2ln(e+ 1|Ps|OPT12C )
1
Now we analyze the expected utility of mechanism M2
given a selling clearing price ps. Let the optimal utility of
M2 be OPT2 = maxp∈Pg(ps)W2(B, ps, p). Similarly, define
the sets Rt2 = {p ∈ Pg(ps) : W2(B, ps, p) > OPT2 − t2}
and R2t2 = {p ∈ Pg(ps) : W2(B, ps, p) ≤ OPT2 − 2t2} for
a small constant t2 > 0. Then, we have
Pr(M2(B) ∈ R2t2) ≤ |Pg(ps)|exp(
−2t2
2C
)
For t2 ≥ 2Cln(
|Pg(ps)|OPT2
t2
)
2
,
Ep∈Pg(ps)[W2(B, ps, p)] > OPT2 − 3t2
8Let t2 =
2Cln(e+
2|Pg(ps)|OPT2
2C )
2
≥ 2C2 , we get the expected
utility of mechanism M2 given ps
Ep∈Pg(ps)[W2(B, ps, p)] > OPT2 − 3
2ln(e+
2|Pg(ps)|OPT2
2C )
2
In term of the definition of W1, we have W1(B, ps) =
maxp∈Pg(ps)W2(B, ps, p) = OPT2(ps). Then, we obtain the
expected utility (social welfare) of our mechanism as follows.
Ep1∈PsEp2∈Pg(p1)[W2(B, p1, p2)]
>Ep1∈Ps [OPT2(ps)− 3
2ln(e+
2|Pg(ps)|OPT2
2C )
2
]
>Ep1∈Ps [OPT2(ps)]− 3
2ln(e+
2|Pg(1)|OPT1
2C )
2
>OPT1 − 3(
2Cln(e+ 1|Ps|OPT12C )
1
+
2Cln(e+
2|Pg(1)|OPT1
2C )
2
)
=OPT1 − 6(
Cln(e+ 1|Ps|OPT12C )
1
+
Cln(e+
2|Pg(1)|OPT1
2C )
2
)
where |Pg(1)| = maxp∈Ps |Pg(p)|, and OPT1 ≥ OPT2.
Therefore, DDSM achieves approximate social welfare
maximization.
From its design, obviously DDSM also achieves other
economic properties such as individual rationality and budget
balance. Here, we just present the related theorem without
proving it.
Theorem 4. DDSM is of individual rationality and budget
balance.
V. IMPROVEMENT OF DDSM
In the previous section, we introduced our basic mechanism
with differential privacy, γ-truthfulness and approximate social
welfare maximization for double spectrum auctions. In this
section, we improve the basic mechanism in three aspects,
namely auction algorithm design, utility function design, and
grouping algorithm extension, enhancing the utility and appli-
cability of our mechanism.
A. Improved Mechanism
Our main observation is that, the basic mechanism first
randomly selects the selling clearing price ps and then the
buying clearing price pg , by employing twice the exponential
mechanism, and both selections add roughly the same noise
to the mechanism. Then, could we just select a clearing price
pair (ps, pg) from a properly defined set by employing the
exponential mechanism, adding roughly the same noise to
the mechanism only once? If so, we can greatly improve the
utility of the auction outcome without degrading the privacy
level. Following this line of thinking, we design our improved
mechanism as follows.
1) Design Detail:
(1) Buyer Group Formation: Exactly the same as that of
our basic mechanism.
(2) Double-sided Price Selection: The essential difference
of this step from our basic mechanism is that, we view any
two clearing prices ps and pg as a combination, and randomly
select them out together at a time. Here, we mainly state what
is different, and leave other things untouched. That is, all other
operations that are not detailed, for instance, the group bid
computation, and quotation and bid sorting, are just the same
as that of our basic mechanism.
In order to select a pair of prices ps and pg at a time with
the exponential mechanism, we first need to define the output
set properly. To ensure that each transaction is profitable, it
is necessary that ps ≤ pg . Thus, we can define the output set
P = {(ps, pg)|ps ∈ Ps ∧ pg ∈ Pg(ps)}, where Ps = [1..qmax]
and Pg(ps) = [ps..nmax · bmax].
Next, we define the utility function of the exponential
mechanism as W (q,b, ps, pg), the social welfare resulted
from clearing prices ps and pg . Note that here W can be
computed by Eq. (1) just as in our basic mechanism. The
sensitivity is ∆W = nmax · bmax − 1.
Then, we define a mechanism M chooses each price pair
(ps, pg) with a probability exponentially proportional to its
corresponding the social welfare:
Pr[M(q,b) = (ps, pg)] =
exp(
W (q,b,(ps,pg))
2∆W )∑
(ps,pg)′∈P exp(
W (q,b,(ps,pg)′)
2∆W )
where  is the privacy budget.
The improved price selection is depicted in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Improved Double-sided Price Selection
Input: The set of sellers M, the sellers’ quotation profile q,
the set of buyers N, the buyers’ bid profile b, the buyer
grouping G, and privacy budgets .
Output: Selling and buying clearing prices ps and pg
Steps (1), (2) and (3) are exactly he same as Algorithm 1
(4) Compute probability distributions and select prices:
1: ∆W ← nmax · bmax − 1
2: for ps ← 1 to qmax do
3: for pg ← ps to nmax · bmax do
4: Pr[M(q,b) = (ps, pg)]←
exp(
W (q,b,(ps,pg))
2∆W )∑
(ps,pg)′∈P exp(
W (q,b,(ps,pg)′)
2∆W )
5: end for
6: end for
7: (ps, pg)←M(q,b) // Select clearing price pair
8: return ps and pg
(3) Auction Outcome Release: Given a price pair (ps, pg),
this step is exactly the same as that of our basic mechanism.
2) Analysis:
We mainly show that the improve mechanism achieves
differential privacy, γ-truthfulness, and approximate social
welfare maximization. Note that the properties of individual
9rational and budget balance hold similarly for the improved
mechanism, but we omit the proofs due to the obviousness.
Theorem 5. The improved mechanism achieves -differential
privacy.
The proof of Theorem 5 is omitted. The improved mecha-
nism is simply an application of the exponential mechanism,
and thus it is certainly -differential privacy.
Theorem 6. The improved mechanism is γ-truthful, where
γ = max(u1max, u2max).
Proof. The proof of Theorem 6 is similar to that of Theorem
2. Here, we only point out some differences, but will not go
into detail about the entire proof.
Since the improved mechanism chooses both selling and
buying clearing prices at one time, the expected utility of a
seller m should become
E[um(q,b,Ps,Pg)]
=
∑
p1∈Ps
(
∑
p2∈Pg(p1)
α(p1, p2)) · um(q,b, p1, p2)
where α(p1, p2) = Pr[M(q,b) = (p1, p2)].
Similarly, the expected utility of a buyer n should be
E[un(q,b,P′g,P′s)]
=
∑
p2∈P′g
(
∑
p1∈P′s(p2)
α(p1, p2)) · un(q,b, p1, p2)
where P′g = [1..nmax · bmax], and P′s(p2) = [1..p2].
With these computations of expected utilities, we can derive
that the improved mechanism is u1max-truthful for sellers and
u2max-truthful for buyers. So the improved mechanism is γ-
truthful, where γ = max(u1max, u2max).
Theorem 7. The improved mechanism achieves approximate
social welfare maximization.
Proof. Here we use p to represent tuple (ps, pg), and let
B = q∪b, C = nmax·bmax−1. For the improved mechanism,
let OPT = maxp∈PW (B, p) denote the maximum W of
mechanism M. We define the sets Rt = {p : W (B, p) >
OPT − t} and R2t = {p : W (B, p) ≤ OPT −2t} for a small
constant t > 0. Then, we have
Pr(R2t) ≤ Pr(R2t)
Pr(Rt)
≤ |P|exp(−t
2C
)
Then, Pr(p ∈ R2t) ≥ 1 − |P|exp(−t2C ). If we have
t ≥ 2Cln(
|P|OPT
t )
 , and we make Pr(p ∈ R2t) ≥ 1 − tOPT .
Therefore, for any t ≥ 2Cln(
|P|OPT
t )
 , we have
Ep∈P[W (B, p)] >
∑
p∈R2t
W (B, p)Pr(M(B) = p)
> (OPT − 2t)(1− t
OPT
)
> OPT − 3t
If we let t = 2Cln(e+
|P|OPT
2C )
 ≥ 2C , and we have
2ln( |P|OPTt )

≤ 2Cln(e+
|P|OPT
2C )

= t
Then put t int the top equation, we have
Ep∈P[W (B, p)] > OPT − 3t
> OPT − 32Cln(e+
|P|OPT
2C )

The proof is completed.
B. Improved Utility Function
It is quite natural that we use the social welfare as the utility
function for the exponential mechanism in DDSM. Our goal
is to maximize the social welfare, and selecting prices in term
of the social welfare they result in is straightforward to this
goal. Nevertheless, we found that the sensitivity of the social
welfare (i.e., nmax · bmax − 1) is rarely realized, since it is
quite unpractical that buyers in a maximally sized buyer group
all bid the maximum bid bmax, while the corresponding seller
asks the minimum quotation 1. In other word, the sensitivity of
the social welfare tends to magnify. Can we find an equivalent
utility function to maximize the social welfare but with a
“smaller” sensitivity? The answer is yes.
Actually, we can simply use the number of seller-buyer-
group winner pairs K as the utility function. Intuitively,
the social welfare is proportional to the number of winner
pairs K, and the sensitivity of K is ∆K = 1. Moreover,
this sensitivity could be frequently realized, since changing
a seller’s quotation or a buyer’s bid in an auction may easily
change the value of K by 1. Thus, from the intuitive discussion
above, we can see that K is possibly a good utility function
that we can find.
We can confirm the above finding by Theorem 8.
Theorem 8. In our mechanism DDSM, it is better to use the
number of winner pairs K as the utility function than the
social welfare W so as to maximize the social welfare.
Proof. Let M denote the mechanism, B denote the input of
M and p denote any output of M.
When using the social welfare W as the utility function, we
get
Pr[M(B) = p] ∝ exp( W
2∆W
)
While using the number of winner pairs K as the utility
function, we get
Pr[M(B) = p] ∝ exp( K
2∆K
)
Furthermore, let C = nmax · bmax − 1, we have
exp(
W
2∆W
) = exp(

∑K
l=1 wl
2C
)
≤ exp(K · C
2C
)
= exp(
K
2∆K
)
= exp(
W
2∆W ′
)
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where ∆W ′ ≤ ∆W .
From the inequality above, we can view the utility function
K as the utility function W with a smaller sensitivity ∆W ′.
That is, by applying K as the utility function, we equivalently
reduce the sensitivity when applying W as the utility function.
Therefore, it is better to use K instead of W as the utility
function, since less noise added is beneficial to maximize the
social welfare.
From Theorem 8, we can see that for both the basic mech-
anism and the improved mechanism, substitution of W with
K will probably improve the utility of the auction outcome.
Moreover, due to the principle of exponential mechanism,
this substitution will not affect the achievement of differential
privacy, γ-truthfulness and approximate social welfare maxi-
mization, and so on.
C. Extension to Random Grouping
In our mechanism, so far, we have required that the buyer
grouping algorithm employed should be deterministic and
independent of buyers’ bids. In other word, the grouping
should be completely determined by the buyer set. Here, we
show that the grouping algorithm can be extended to any
random grouping algorithm independent of buyers’ bids, as
follows.
Theorem 9. For any random grouping algorithm independent
of buyers’ bids, DDSM can still achieve -differential privacy.
Proof. Given any random grouping algorithm G, suppose that
it can be decomposed into T deterministic grouping algorithms
G1,G2, · · · ,GT , with probabilities p1, p2, · · · , pT , respectively,
where
∑T
i=1 pi = 1. Then, when using each Gi(1 ≤ i ≤ T )
as the grouping algorithm in DDSM, we get a mechanism
with -differential privacy due to Theorem 1. By the convexity
of differential privacy as shown in Lemma 2, we also get a
mechanism with -differential privacy when using the random
grouping G. This completes the proof.
We can also show that DDSM achieves γ-truthfulness and
approximate social welfare maximization when using a ran-
dom grouping algorithm, since both properties can be derived
from the property of differential privacy as in our previous
proofs. Here, we omit these proofs due to the space limitation.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we focus on the implementation of DDSM
and the evaluation of its performance.
A. Experimental Settings
In the experimental settings, we simulate the square area
that the buyers are randomly located in is 2000m × 2000m,
and the distance that any two buyers conflict with each other
is 500m. The bids of buyers and the quotations of sellers are
randomly generated in the range [1,50] and [1,100], respec-
tively. The experimental results are averaged over 100 runs.
In our experiments, we focus on the following performance
metrics:
• Social welfare: The sum of all winning buyers’ bids
subtracting the sum of all winning sellers’ quotations.
• Social welfare ratio: The ratio of the social welfare
produced by an auction to the optimal social welfare
produced by all possible auctions.
• Running time: The time spent to execute an auction.
B. Experimental Results
In our experiments, we evaluate and compare the perfor-
mances of the basic DDSM and the improved DDSM. We
also use the truthful double spectrum auction mechanism,
TRUST[12], which has no privacy guarantee, as a benchmark
mechanism.
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Basic DDSM
Fig. 2. Ratio as 1 of basic DDSM grows (1+2 = 1, M = 800, N = 200)
(1) Performance of basic DDSM. In Fig. 2, we plot the
social welfare ratios of the basic DDSM as the privacy budget
1 varies from 0.1 to 0.9 under the constraint 1 + 2 = 1,
while fixing the numbers of sellers and buyers to 800 and 200,
respectively. We can see that the social welfare ratio reaches
the maximum when 1 = 2 = 0.5, and degrades quickly
when 1  2. This shows that both privacy budgets 1 and
2 are roughly of equal significance for achieving utility, so
they should be assigned the same value. Furthermore, 2 is
more sensitive to small values, which would add much noise
to the second exponential mechanism, and make it produce a
poor final social welfare. Overall, the maximum social welfare
ratio is nearly 0.9, and it seems acceptable for practice. In the
following, we will use the basic DDSM with 1 = 2 = 0.5
unless otherwise stated.
(2) Performance of improved utility function. Fig. 3 illus-
trates the comparisons of both the social welfare ratios and
the social welfare values of the basic DDSM when using
different utility functions, namely the social welfare W and the
number of winner pairs K. From Fig. 3(a), we can see that
the resulted social welfare when using utility function K is
obviously higher than that when using utility function W , and
this gap becomes even larger as the number of buyers or sellers
increases. Similar trends can be observed even more apparently
for social welfare ratios in Fig. 3(b). This experimental result
demonstrates that utility function K provide a better utility
and thus a higher social welfare value than utility function W ,
which is in accord with our theoretical result in Section V-B. In
the following experiments, we will use the number of winner
pairs K as the utility function for both the basic DDSM and
the improved DDSM.
11
200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
2.2
x 104
Number of buyers
So
cia
l W
el
fa
re
200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Number of buyers
So
cia
l W
el
fa
re
 R
at
io
 
Basic DDSM(K,M=200)
Basic DDSM(K,M=100)
Basic DDSM(W,M=200)
Basic DDSM(W,M=100)
Basic DDSM(K,M=200)
Basic DDSM(K,M=100)
Basic DDSM(W,M=200)
Basic DDSM(W,M=100)
(a) Social Welfare (b) Social Welfare Ratio
Fig. 3. Comparison between different utility functions
200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
2.2
2.4
x 104
Number of buyers
So
cia
l W
el
fa
re
200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
2.2
2.4
x 104
Number of buyers 
So
cia
l W
el
fa
re
TRUST
Improved DDSM(1)
Basic DDSM(0.5,0.5)
TRUST
Improved DDSM(1)
Basic DDSM(0.5,0.5)
(a) 100 Sellers (b) 200 Sellers
Fig. 4. Social welfare generated by different mechanisms
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Fig. 5. Social welfare ratio of different mechanisms
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Fig. 6. Performance comparison of different bid ranges
(3) Performance comparison: Basic vs. Improved. Fig. 4
traces the social welfare values of the basic DDSM, the
improved DDSM, and TRUST, when the number of buyers
N varies from 200 to 1600 with at the step of 200, and the
number of sellers M is fixed to 100 and 200. Expectedly, the
social welfare values of all three mechanisms increase as the
number of buyers or sellers increases, and TRUST performs
the best, the improved DDSM takes second place, and the basic
DDSM is the last one. Moreover, the curve of the improved
DDSM is much closer to that of TRUST than that of the
basic DDSM. Since TRUST guarantees truthfulness but no
differential privacy, we view TRUST as an ideal benchmark
mechanism to struggle for. The above observations show that
the improved DDSM well outperforms the basic DDSM, and
performs even closely to ideal mechanism of TRUST.
Fig. 5 traces the social welfare ratios of the basic DDSM, the
improved DDSM and TRUST in exactly the same conditions
as that of Fig. 4. As the number of buyers N raises, the
social welfare ratio of TRUST remains basically consistent and
always more than 90%, while the ratios of the basic DDSM
and the improved DDSM are getting closer and closer to that
of TRUST. Similarly, the curve of the improved DDSM is
much closer to that of TRUST than that of the basic DDSM,
and this means that the improved DDSM also well outperforms
the basic DDSM in social welfare ratios.
Fig. 6 shows the comparisons of running times and social
welfare ratios between the basic DDSM and the improved
DDSM as the range size of buyers’ bids (the range size of
sellers’ quotations are twice of it) varies from 100 to 1000,
while the numbers of buyers and sellers are fixed to 800 and
200, respectively. From Fig. 6(a), we can observe that the
improved DDSM takes slightly more running time than the
basic DDSM. The reason is that the size of the sampling set
in the improved DDSM is much bigger than that in the basic
DDSM. Specifically, the former is the product of the range
size of buyers’ bids and that of sellers’ quotations, while the
later is the sum of these two range sizes. From Fig. 6(b),
we find that the social welfare ratio of the improved DDSM
is always higher than that of the basic DDSM as the range
size increases, and this indicates that the increase of the range
size has limited impact on the performance advantage of the
improved DDSM over the basic DDSM.
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(4) Performance of improved DDSM. Fig. 7 depicts the
performance of the improved DDSM in term of social welfare
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ratio as the privacy budget  varies from 0.1 to 1, while
the number of buyers N = 800 and the number of sellers
N = 200. Naturally, the social welfare ratio raises as the
privacy budget  increases and thus the privacy lever lowers.
We can see that the social welfare ratio becomes more than
0.9 when  > 0.5. The performance could be acceptable for
practical applications.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have proposed a differentially private dou-
ble spectrum auction mechanism, DDSM, which also achieves
γ-truthfulness and approximate social welfare maximization.
To achieve our design goal, we employ the exponential mech-
anism twice to randomly select selling and buying clearing
prices, respectively, and we theoretically prove that all the
three properties above-mentioned hold. Later, we improve our
mechanism by employing the exponential mechanism only
once to reduce the noise added to the mechanism, by designing
a utility function with a smaller sensitivity, and by extending
deterministic buyer grouping algorithm to random ones. Both
theoretical analysis and experimental evaluations show that the
improved mechanism achieves a better utility compared to the
basic mechanism for the same privacy level.
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